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Crisis and Continuity: National Identity, Islamic Socialism, and Authoritarian Politics in Pakistan (1971–1979)

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Abstract

The years 1971 to 1979 are landmark years in Pakistan. There was a great change in the national identity and the governance it had. After Pakistan got rid of East Pakistan and the establishment of Bangladesh, the country was left with serious issues. This center of the Two Nation Theory faced a fundamental premise which was very threatening. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto emerged to vie for a complex era for driving the country. He initiated the Islamic socialism that bolstered the application of values coupled with socialist economic policy. Alongside these economic policies, he started to regulate and take care of the most major problems, one of such was to take care of industries and also redistribute the land. All these, nonetheless, continued to group the people within the country. The situation of the divisions based on the sect, the language people speak, the ethnicity created the situation that negated to one people one nation. Bhutto's rule also led to the concentration of power in his hands to an extreme level, which brought with it the lack of democratic processes in his country, his government's tyrannical tactics and his dependence on martial law. The effect of this is still a burden faced by his country. The Islamic policies of the government during the time of General Zia-ul-Haq focused on the promotion of Islamic solidarity in the Middle East, which was weakened by the weak foreign policy of the previous government. Although Pakistan was not part of the OPEC, it quickly seized the opportunity to make a goodwill gesture in return for the aid it would receive in the form of oil and the 1.3 million citizens that it had to take in from the Islamic world. His eminent Marshal, that is, the Supreme Leader of all commanders, led the Islamic nations, Pakistan and Commander Zia to ensure the removal of such grief. Iran remained strong, but its place was not obvious because it was bereft backed.

Keywords: Islamic Socialism; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, National Identity Crisis; Military Coup.

1. Introduction

The years from 1971 to 1979 marked a major change in Pakistan's politics, society, and ideology. The drastic separation of East Pakistan which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh not only changed the country in terms of geography and population but also caused a deep crisis of national identity. The defeat of the Two-Nation Theory which had been the ideological basis of Pakistan revealed the cracks that ran through the country on the basis of ethnicity, language, and region, and made it even more difficult to build a nation out of such a diverse society. In the wake of 1971, Pakistan had no choice but to overhaul its political and social framework and at the same time redefine the concept of being Pakistani. The civilian leaders, especially Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, tried to tackle these problems through the adoption of Islamic Socialism which put the stresses on social justice, economic reforms, and the unifying function of Islamic identity.

In the meantime, the country was dealing with not only the ongoing tensions between different regions and ethnic groups but also the struggle for power between the military and the civilians as well as attempts to gain a foothold in the Muslim world through the establishment of a Muslim bloc. Consequently, this period is seen as one of the turning points in Pakistan's history, characterized by the struggle for reconfiguration in ideological, political, and economic terms. It is a period that yields abundant insights into the interaction between government, identity formation, and socio-political development. The time also emphasizes the difficulties that come with nation-building in a country that is undergoing internal strife, is inclined to put up with authoritarian rule, and is affected by the external geo-political realities.

2. National Identity Crisis Post-1971

The 1971 dissolution of Pakistan, which resulted in the formation of Bangladesh from East Pakistan, did indeed raise a question mark over the very concept on which the Two-Nation Theory was resting and shook the basis for viability for a national identity of Pakistan. The secession of East Pakistan was a jolt which let the fractures of the remainder of the nation go into clear view. According to Bilal (2017) and Nawaz (2009), the secession of East Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 triggered a profound national identity crisis questioning the very foundation of the state. This demanded a redefinition of what it means to be Pakistani and what role states could have in contributing to a shared national identity recognizable amidst existing regional, ethnic, and linguistic diversities. The dismemberment of East Pakistan had been received as a rejection of the Two-Nation Theory on which the state of Pakistan was created. Its followers meant to assert that the decimation of the state had already rendered the Two-Nation Theory ineffective. According to that theory, Muslims of the Indian subcontinent had been considered one nation, and now that one nation had undergone a big shock. The crisis brought out ethnic and regional tensions among the remains of Pakistan. The Sindhis, Baloch, Pashtuns, and Punjabis were all very different, with a host of grievances that would splinter the remaining pieces further if not treated accordingly. The crisis of 1971 has revitalized the zeal of regarding Islam as a unifying force above all ethnic/regional loyalties. One can see the rise of Islamic identity and values in that epoch. The historians of ethnicity and regional issues in this period took much space. They tried to see the attempts of the state to regain lost rights and strife to promote national integration. Among the themes are debates about the relative success and failure of such attempts, the effects of such regional movements on national politics, and broader implications for the Pakistani national identity. The scholars debate at great lengths upon the manner in which the regional personalities have engaged with the policies that were introduced at the center.

During the crisis in 1971, coupled with Islamic revivalism efforts towards national integration of Pakistan, the intent was vociferously directed to enhance the political trajectory by inculcating

Islamic spirit and identity internally and externally in terms of national identity. The statement of Islam also continued so, particularly in the aftermath of the crisis of 1971, which makes it able to serve an intellectual imperative of ideological consistency. There was an appeal to Islamic identity in Pakistan, providing new life to its affirmation and purposes. National identity was more emphasized in Islam's unity and power centralization (Gardezi, 1982; Kadir & Jawad, 2020). The state sought to redefine national identity regarding shared religious and cultural values" (Caron, 2016; Luckham, 1994). Many historians highlight Bhutto's regime and, about him, the 'Islamization' policies as they account for national identity. It entails all the details, from the need behind the policies to the implementation process and the effectiveness of such policies in resolving an identity crisis. Debate rages among the scholars at the forefront on how far the centrality of Islam conditioned the political and social development of Pakistan in that period.

The political history of Pakistan was very vibrant from 1971 to 1979, with a great time crisis due to the separation of East Pakistan. In general, the civilian rulers, especially Z.A. Bhutto, felt that there was a need to embark on strategies and policies that would redefine the national identity and develop unity, economic, and social reforms. The 1973 Constitution, emphasis on Islamization, and sponsoring initiatives to redress ethnic and regional grievances would, therefore, be at the core of such efforts. The complexity and hazards of this period are on full display in political historiography, as well as how the relations between the national identity crisis and state reconstruction were juggled. Indeed, the very nature of the political elite, the very play of influence by Bhutto's leadership, and the overall socio-political dynamic which canvassed functioning Pakistan in these years were sandwiched under strained analysis by the analysts. The interaction of ideology with policy and the ensuing consequence which places a custodial burden on the future of Pakistan divert into chimneys of government success and failure. This era, therefore, remains an era of inquiry from which modern scholars must grapple to make sense of the processes of nation-building, identity formation, and political development in Pakistan. Indeed, the lessons to be learned from that era must remain extracted from the debilities of the debates on national identity, governance, and the role of ideology in determining the state trajectory.

3. Emergence of Bangladesh

The emergence of Bangladesh was a landmark in the history of Pakistan, hence restructuring its political and social facade of existence. The events in the annals of Pakistan, separation of East Pakistan, and establishment of Bangladesh in 1971 are such that they cannot be matched on any weighing scale or measured by any means since the fall and since 1947 of united Pakistan into two separate independent units, one of which is Bangladesh, after a bloody struggle. The loss of East Pakistan reconfigured all scales of national identity, political dynamics, and historiography within Pakistan. The birth of Bangladesh was a landmark in the geopolitics of South Asia (Khan & Wazir, 2011; Kenar & Shaw, 2020).

This research looks into how civilian rulers in Pakistan leveraged the emergence of Bangladesh and wove it into the texture of writing political history for its ends, answering a crisis of national identity and reconfiguring the country's political landscape. A massive gulf emerged in linguistic and cultural disparities between the two parts of the country, popularly referred to as East and West Pakistan. Neglect in identifying with the Bengalis by imposing Urdu as the national language only added to the history of East Pakistan's perennial discontent.

In early 1948, Mohammad Ali Jinnah had declared un-conditionally that Urdu would be the only national language of Pakistan. In doing so, the political elites at the center failed to understand that one federating unit of Pakistan, which comprised the majority of the total population of Pakistan,

was unfamiliar with Urdu. Their constant demand was to promote the status of their language, Bengali, to that of Urdu. The leaders at the center overlooked that the Muslims of Bengal submerged their distinct cultural identity within the national discourse for the demand of Pakistan (Jalal, 1995, p.102).

East Pakistan felt economically deprived, living without the many sources and projects of development that West Pakistan. It was quite contrived the economic policies that exploited West Pakistan and ensured its mass-scale poverty and underdevelopment in the eastern wing. This was not so for East Pakistan because, though the two wings were more populous, they were always given lesser resources or less of a say in any political scenario. The fact that nothing could be done with the Six-Point Movement, thus depriving East Pakistan of its essential aim for more autonomy, was more like adding fuel to the burning intensity of the fire for independence.

In 1970, Pakistan conducted its general elections, and the power was transferred back to the most popular ruling party of the people of East Pakistan, named Awami League, under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, with a landslide majority getting it a mandate of independence that touched raw nerves amongst the ruling elite from West Pakistan. Tension started increasing with flat denial by the Central Government to hand over power to the Awami League, which was victorious (Raghavan, 2013). The military-coordinated crackdowns in March of 1971 were felt across East Pakistan in an attempt to stagnate the independence movement. However, they saw a retaliatory response like mass atrocities, which led to great humanitarian crises. The 26th March 1971 Proclamation of East Pakistan was followed by a war between the Pakistan forces and Mukti Bahini or the Liberation Army along with the help of India that gave birth to Bangladesh on the 16th day of December 1971 (Sisson & Rose, 1990).

Then, an unfortunate development took place, completely eroding further negotiation prospects. It marked the end of a united Pakistan. On 22 March, Mujib and Tajuddin had an unscheduled meeting with Yahya. They categorically stated that the Awami League could not agree to set up any central or national cabinet. Instead, they wanted a power transfer to the East and West Pakistan provinces. This meant they formally asked for the country to split into Bangladesh and West Pakistan (Choudhury, 1974, p.169).

The loss of East Pakistan served as a wake-up call to the government regarding governance and national unity (Bilal, 2017). Historians involved in the battle and the search for the root causes behind the division never ceased to underscore elements associated with the fundamental grievances of East Pakistan, political miscalculations of the ruling elite, or a barbaric military backlash. A more in-depth discussion on the diagnosis related to the 1970 elections, political impasse, and aspects of the crisis on the international plane follow in the analyses. The loss of East Pakistan had come as a rude shock to the national psyche. The first reaction was that of disbelief, and this loss was sought to be belittled in every possible way. Z.A. Bhutto came to power and became the President of Pakistan after the 1971 war. Bhutto believed in reconstruction at the national level. He had to reconstruct state institutions and bring back political stability, solving economic problems that deteriorated further because of war among the important political reforms that the government brought out to at least overcome its failures in setup during the Bhutto era, circumstances leading to secession expedited the integration, drafting of a new constitution in 1973.

A little more emphasis was put on national unity for the sake of the crisis. Ultimately, the Bhutto government developed the argument that there was a need for resuscitation and development, this time in a much better and united Pakistan. Last, the issue that was part of the core defining of the national narrative was that of Islamic identity. In this case, Islam was professed as one of the unifying

things whereby ethnic and regional divisions could be overcome, and one could lean upon this as an ideological base for state identity.

Basically, these histories were attempts at re-definitions of the official history of the events leading to the secession of East Pakistan. The narration that prevailed at the time rationalized the emergence of Bangladesh as a product of external interference and internal treachery, mainly an Indian design. The Pakistani soldiers and martyred civilians of the 1971 war were sacrificed and projected into works of heroism. This story might instill shared emotion based on resilience and pride in the face of adversity. The political and military leadership was censured for failure in the crisis. There was also a great debate regarding mismanagement and strategic blunders in the story of defeating Pakistan and East Pakistan.

While pointing fingers at the age, many interpreter-historians underline the remolding of national identity and rewriting history. When these strands are thrown upon an ideological shift, so tectonically tilted towards an Islamic identity, with the reinterpretation of the 1971 crisis, the discussions thrust themselves a good many threads. The period also includes historiography about political and institutional reforms the government of Bhutto was able to undertake. Firstly, one views the latter regarding its effect on governance, political stability, and social development. There are discussions within such respect about the successes and limits of these reforms and what they might have brought for further political development within Pakistan. Most of the historians have located themselves in attempts to deal with the issues of ethnicity and regionalism, trying to redress the grievances and integrate them into the polity, and how fruitful or fruitless such attempts were: the impact of regional movements on national politics and the general outcomes for national identity. Individual historians have thoroughly and sophisticatedly assessed the interplay between state policies and regional identities.

Between 1971 and 1979, we had the period of Bhutto's resurrection and his fall, the imposing of martial law, and 1977 military rule under General Zia-ul-Haq. The peculiar thing about Bhutto's rule has been the manner in which he sought to concentrate levels of power to drive the lines of "Islamic Socialism" through measures of nationalization, land reform measures, and giving powers to the center. Pakistan has perhaps suffered one of the most significant political oppositions on the religious right, on the left, and the regional parties. Bhutto's government had to fight the political opposition back with tools like censorship, imprisonment, and allegations of poll rigging. It was not until 1977 when a military coup finally ousted the Bhutto government on the plea of General Zia-ul-Haq to reinstall the order and redress the rigging of the elections. Perhaps one of the most controversy-laden politics of Pakistan turned out to be what took place as a part of Bhutto's arrest, consequent trial, and subsequent execution in 1979. This is what historians of this period have been mostly concerned with: how civilian rule was conducted, the failures afflicting the government of Z.A. Bhutto, and the context of the coup. Below, we detail as we focus closely on policy choices and governance politics that Bhutto presented and grappled with. We get the feel of how martial law then impacted national identity and, in turn, further democracy in Pakistan, respectively.

The darkest period in Pakistani politics was from 1971 to 1979. The tragedy of East Pakistan losing to Bangladesh at that time plunged the Pakistani nation into a national identity crisis. The disintegration of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh were critical happenings that really changed the national psyche and led to huge introspection on the part of politics and the military (Adnan, 2006; Kumar, 2021).

The civilian rules took the matter of strategies and policies through a wheel, especially under Z.A. Bhutto, in a series toward readapting from the crisis of their national identity, building unity, and executing economic and social reforms. Regarding these irons in the fires, the 1973 Constitution

remained central, along with a renewed one regarding Islamization and the steps to amend ethnic and regional complaints. The related political historiography based on this period takes into consideration due regard for the hardships and complexities faced while going through a national crisis of identity and during the remodeling of the state. It contains analyses in connection with the part of political elites, the leadership of Bhutto, and more general socio-political dynamics built up during those years to a large extent in the country. This research is replete with discussions on successes, governmental efforts' failures, the interplay of ideology and policy, and their implications for Pakistan's future. Importance is attached to human life of this period, as every scholarship understands the nature of the processes relating to nation-building, identity formation, and political development that reach the shores of Pakistan. Lessons learned from that experience provide important contributions to this contemporary debate by demanding responses to issues of national identity, governance, and ideology's role in setting the course of the state.

4. Islamic Socialism

The role that Islamic socialism played in shaping Pakistan's political history, 1971-1979. The era of Z.A. Bhutto was within the dominance of Islamic socialism, which was predestined to be one of the causative agents of the change in the situation of political history in Pakistan. The background of such a period was the secession in East Pakistan, the deep national identity crisis, and attempts by Bhutto to reorganize Pakistan's political, social, and economic canvas. He emulsified the Islamic Ideals with the ideology of a socialist Pakistan in such a way that he would find solutions to the problems that had arisen for the country on Islamic principles. In that regard, the essay follows up this line in an attempt to excavate the way Islamic socialism was deployed for the political history of Pakistan at that juncture of time by the civilian rulers at the inscription. As far as the historiographical level is concerned, the impacts on national identity, governance, and economic policies with social reforms are investigated, among other things.

Pakistan was created based on the Two-Nation Theory. However, a shocking defeat in the War with India and, with it, the secession of East Pakistan, which later became Bangladesh, has snatched away this theoretical basis, making it a grave crisis of identity and legitimacy for this nascent state. A reconstruction of the nation, rectification of socio-economic imbalances, and integration of national identity became duties critical as never before. Islamic Socialism was a vision where Islamic identity met a set of socialistic economic policies to hold together and create a moderate society. Islamic socialism was stated as a mixture of Islamic values with socialist economics to ensure all social equities are reduced, and economic development is fostered under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Khan & Wazir, 2011).

Islamic Socialism was, in fact, an attempt to work out how the ideals of Islam, such as social justice, equality, and welfare for people with low incomes, would fit into the political and economic framework of the state. He really felt like common ground was made by the principles of justice and welfare of the community prevalent in Islam with socialism. Bhutto's ideological stance was that he enabled intervention by the state, nationalization of core sectors, and redistribution of wealth to lessen inequalities. In that sense, Bhutto saw Socialism as part of the solution to economic development and social justice. The era saw the rise of Islamic socialism under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, blending religious principles with socialist ideals to address socio-economic issues (Abbas, 2010).

Most historians try to delve further into the ideological moorings of Islamic Socialism and its place in the enunciation of Bhutto's policies during this period. That is how it fuses Bhutto's analyses with discourses, writings, and policy initiatives regarding how he tried to synthesize these two principles of Islam and socialism to look for solutions to Pakistan's problems. Just as was done after

the war of 1965 and the crisis of 1971, exuberant emphasis was again put on Islam to act as a unifying force for Pakistan. Bhutto's experiment with Islamic Socialism tried to equate a national identity with the principles of Islam regarding justice, equality, and community welfare. Promotion of Islamic Values: The state projected Islamic values to the public domain through state media, educational curricula, and public events. Growing efforts were being seen to emphasize the Islamic heritage belonging to Pakistan and to strengthen Pakistan's identity as an Islamic state. It was a national symbol reflecting Pakistan as an Islamic state that was promoted in greater measures during Bhutto's administration. This means that in most cases, art and literature in the Islamic religion were popular, and Islamic cultural heritage was popularized.

A curriculum change is an initiative to change each area's general skills and knowledge comprising cognitive, physical, social, and independent learning skills. The curriculum was changed so that the Islamic religion's history, cultural aspects, and values were urged. Islamic studies were made compulsory up to a particular high school level, and much effort was put into assimilating the teachings and principles of Islam into the education system. Much in this regard speaks to the fact that Islamic Socialism's role is extended to reformation or even redefinition of the national identity for Pakistan regarding the debate of governmental, cultural policy, educational reform, and programs set to instill values of Islam within the masses. The analysts question to what extent Bhutto's emphasis on Islam as a bonding glue has seeped down in terms of national identity and the overall ambiance of the socio-political scenario.

Most historians who have written over a long period have focused on ethnic and regional challenges at the core of the government's efforts to redress grievances and solve the national unity problem. These are to be analyzed for their success and limitations, the impact of regional movements on national politics, and broader implications for national identity in the case of Pakistan. Indeed, scholars probe these complex linkages between regional identities and policies of the central government.

The political historiography of this era is primarily based on political developments that resulted in the fall of Bhutto and military rule in the country. It gives an account of the failures or problems Bhutto's government faced, allegations of electoral rigging, and the role of the military in its political interventions. It has debated the implications of Bhutto's judicial murder for democracy and political stability in Pakistan. It can very rightly be termed within the politico terminologies of Pakistan as the decade of Islamic Socialism between 1971 and 79. The civilians made use of the ideology of Islamic Socialism, particularly Z.A Bhutto, as a tangible platform for the reconfiguration of the identity crisis, ensuring social justice, and following through with economic reforms. Precisely, crystallization became the form that the 1973 Constitution took, including the role assigned to Islamization and the attempts to solve ethnic and regional grievances. In an era in which nation-building problems ran parallel with the worst identity crisis, the state had to be constructed again. From that point, a political historiography evolved. Herein, the scholars debate the kind of politics in which Bhutto's political elite and leadership greatly brought about some change. At the same time, broad socio-political dynamics made the development process in these 11 years. Thus, one would seem to be debating the successes and limitations of government efforts, ideological-policy interfaces, and the implications for Pakistan.

5. Civilian vs. Military Rule

The period between 1971 and 1979 was really eventful and rocky for Pakistan. While tensions ranged almost throughout this period, it was marked by confrontations between civilian and military authorities. The era saw the rise of Islamic socialism under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, blending religious

principles with socialist ideals to address socio-economic issues (Abbas, 1991). It was the period that played host to the rise of a civilian setup under Z.A. Bhutto after the bruising episode of the secession of East Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh. He buoyed the attempts at civilian dominance, dozens of reforms, and his administration of the national id dilemma in the politics of the time. The narration winds up with the military coup of 1977 and the imposition of martial law by General Zia-Ul-Haq. This research goes the extra mile to explain how the civilian rulers capitalized on the problem of the conflict between civilian and military rule in political history writing. The strategies, policies, and general historiographical implications of that time have been considered. The fall of East Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 represented the most fatal blow to the national identity and political steadiness of Pakistan. The need of the hour was redefining the governance structures of the country and their orientation to national unity. The military's role in the 1971 conflict and subsequent period was widely criticized. It had miserably failed to stop the secession and inhuman actions in East Pakistan, which led to an enormous loss of prestige and credibility.

Bhutto did try to alter the military setup in a way as to minimize its role in politics and bring about a dramatic change. This most certainly meant rescheduling retirements of key army officers who were most likely to be a potential threat to the supremacy of civilian rule and then filling up those posts with loyalists. It was an active defense policy the civilian government followed, and it laid a claim for the management of military spending. Bhutto needed the armed forces to bow low to civilian leadership in strategic and operational decisions.

Research interpretations of this period also highlight Bhutto's fight for the supremacy of the civilian over the military. We observe his structural reforms in the military and the way he took up the defense policies. Even more so, witness the effects of the 1973 constitution in general. More than anything, we see success and failure in the invoking of the civilian-military democratic paradigm through this narration. His treatment of political opposition is also said to have included allegations of rigging in elections and anti-democratic behavior on his part. There were allegations of rigging in the 1977 general elections as well, and nation-wide protests ensued, along with political agitation. The government was accused of trying to suppress dissent and political freedom. Opposition leaders were under arrest, and the media still faced many censorship orders.

6. Ethnic And Regional Tensions

6.1 Balochistan Insurgency

Balochistan has been a hotspot for insurgency since it was a source of discontent over the political scenario and economic domination. The Baloch nationalists were demanding not only the proper provincial voice and the control over the wealth that the federal government was already taking, such as gas, coal, and minerals, but also that the federal government and other provinces were benefiting from the resources at the expense of the Baloch anyway. The peak of the conflict came during the 1970s under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto when the central government, in 1973, dismissed a Pandit Raj government of the National Awami Party that had been elected with a solid base of support and surrounded it with a military operation that deepened local resentment (International Crisis Group, 2006). The political negotiations were still happening from time to time, but the government methods of dealing with the situation consisted mainly of military action, which only led to the Baloch feeling more discontented and mistrustful of the state. The persistence of the government failure to satisfy the root needs around autonomy and resource control opened the door to a cycle of rebellion and deprivation; thus, Balochistan became the spot of ethnic and regional tensions within Pakistan that never got off the radar (Harrison, 1981)

6.2 Sindhi Nationalism

The revival of Sindhi nationalism in the said time was very clearly a big claim to the province's cultural, linguistic, and political identity. The Sindhi leaders, feeling the central government had been treating them with contempt, started to press for with the government at the level of their historical heritage, control over local resources, and providing participation in the national governance that was really meaningful and not just symbolic. Federal authorities, on the other hand, opted for a mix of political engagement and selective developmental initiatives that included infrastructure, education, and economic development projects, to address the demands that had been there for so long. These measures, while aimed at promoting provincial integration and national unity, revealed the persistence of neglect and inequality among the Sindhi people and thus the difficulty of reconciling regional autonomy with a uniform national identity (Waseem, 1994; Jalal, 1995). The ascendancy of Sindhi nationalism affected the national political discourse in the first place and it triggered discussions on political issues such as federalism, decentralization, and fair distribution of resources. The movement called for the central government to accept and embrace the ethnic and regional diversity of the country thus, it made the issue of political stability more difficult to attain as long as the aspirations of the provinces were not met. In addition, Sindhi nationalism was a pointer to the wider difficulties that Pakistan was facing in its efforts to form a single national identity out of the many different ethnic groups, especially after the horrific incidents of 1971.

7. Problems of Pashtun and Mohajir identity

The Pashtuns and Mohajirs, too, had their identity problem along with the problem of them following them. The government policies tried to bring about countrywide nationalism with recognition at the regional and ethnic levels. Pakistan has suffered more than most countries that became independent after World War II from difficulties in nation-building; the state has been unable to socialize the people into a willing acceptance that all are indeed Pakistanis. It is the only country in the newly independent world that has seen a part (the majority, in terms of population) separate violently to become an independent state, Bangladesh. The loss of Bangladesh was a major psychological shock to those who supported the two-nation theory that the Hindus and Muslims of the sub-continent were separate nations. The secession left residual Pakistan with a new group that had majority status, the Punjabis, who comprise about 60 percent of the population. Cries of Punjabi dominance had been common, especially in the unified province of West Pakistan (1955-1970) before the loss of Bangladesh. It seems to the residents of the three smaller provinces (Sindh, Balochistan, and the Northwest Frontier Province) that the Punjabis have a greater share in the governance of the state than their population entitles them to. The fact that, except for the military (a key exception, of course, given the history of military governments in Pakistan), this was not correct matters little. There is also the belief that the Punjab receives more than its due share of investment. However, the major magnet for investment remains Karachi in Sindh, and rural electrification has proceeded much further in Sindh than in Punjab (Baxter & Barker, 1991, p.39).

8. Rewriting National Identity

Following the 1971 disaster and a series of political changes, Islam was recognized as the most important unifying factor for Pakistan, thus playing the role of ideology to repair the broken national identity. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Islamic Socialism and General Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization policies were in different ways trying to reestablish Pakistan's character on a clearly Islamic basis, though with dissimilar aims and methods. Government-controlled media, updated school curricula, and organized public functions were employed in a very clever way to spread Islamic values, morals and ethics,

thereby planting them into the national consciousness of the whole country. The reforms in education, especially the introduction of Islamic studies and the encouragement of Islamic history and culture, not only marked the centrality of Islam in daily life and civic duty but also made the role of Islam very prominent in the society. Besides, cultural programs and national symbols, such as the flag and anthem, were used to display an Islamic influence as a unifying story. These joint efforts were not only meant to bring about national unity after the division of East Pakistan but also to legitimize the power of the governments that came after through the association of state identity with religious ideology (Gardezi, 1982). Therefore, the period is marked as an important moment in Pakistan's history when the boundaries between religion and politics became very thin in the process of national integration.

9. Official Histories

Official histories during that period mostly attempted to recast the causes and understand the 1971 crisis and subsequent civilian-military conflict. The narration framed the creation of Bangladesh as a consequence of foreign intrusion, primarily that of India, and internal betrayal. Sacrifices made by Pakistani soldiers and civilians were usually projected and informed to lay down during and after the war of 1971 in political struggles to be carried out as acts of heroism, and the general aim was to inject them with a feeling of collective resilience and pride even in difficult situations. There also emerged criticism of the political and military leadership, which lost the ability to prevent crises and maintain stability. This also includes the debate on mismanagement and strategic mistakes of the leadership that lost East Pakistan in their control and which followed a political crisis.

Many historians love this period, and they speculate about the process of rewriting national character and history. In many ways, the experimental treatment in academics and the actual use of these narratives to develop national unity and address the identity crisis and legitimacy of the respective regimes may be interesting.

The nine years from 1971 to 1979 ended in 1979, an episode drained of almost charged significance in Pakistan's political past: deep national neurosis, the swearing-in of Z.A Bhutto's civilian government, and its overthrow by the military dictatorship headed by General Zia-ul-Haq. However, the focal point between these seemingly defining events is the tussle between these two contending centers of power: Pakistan's civilian and military rule.

The civilian rulers, particularly Bhutto, were trying to establish civilian supremacy, implement large-scale reforms, and solve the country's ongoing problems in the light of Islamic Socialism. The political opposition in 1977, regional tussles, and a coup's reinstatement of military power brought to light the ongoing tussle between civilian and military authorities in Pakistan. The political opposition of 1977, regional conflicts, and a coup reinstating military power revealed the ongoing struggle between Pakistan's civil and military authorities.

The political historiography of this era illustrates the intricacies and difficulties faced in the torments of a national identity crisis, civilian rule, and socio-economic disparities. The practices discussed here highlight the perspective taken towards the period and the political elite's role examined, leadership under Bhutto, and the wider socio-political dynamics in which Pakistan's development is characterized during these years. The focus will shift between achievements and failures regarding government activities, how ideology and policy intertwined, and what this means for the future of Pakistan.

Thus, this period is of great importance for scholars who are interested in examining the nation-making, identity formation, and political development in Pakistan. The echoes of lessons

learnt during this period are still quite loud in modern discussions on the topics of national identity, governance, and the influence of civil-military relations on a state's development direction.

10. Formation of Muslim Bloc

Efforts were made to forge alliances within the Muslim world to strengthen Pakistan's geopolitical position by forming Muslim blocs (Akhtar, 1989). Thus, The Muslim bloc remained a realist formation in Pakistan's foreign policy and inner political discourse from 1971 to 1979. Following up on the secession of East Pakistan and the event of the birth of Bangladesh in 1971, a profound crisis of national identity overwhelmed Pakistan, and it looked forward to redefining its role in the comity of nations. The notion of a Muslim bloc was the most salient device for national integration, the enhancement of the international status of Pakistan, and the fulfillment of internal political demands during the civilian regime for Z.A. Bhutto. The research will trace how the writing of political history took on board the question of making a Muslim bloc and its consequences in terms of its impact on identity, foreign policy, domestic politics, and historiographical narrative.

The demand for a Muslim bloc was related to the Islamic identity of Pakistan. Being an Islamic republic, Pakistan saw itself as a leader among the Umma of the Muslim world. This identity was used to foster the idea of solidarity with other Muslim-majority countries. It was simultaneously determined that Pakistan joined the Non-Aligned Movement, which ensured that apart from being aligned within the Muslim bloc, its tilt towards the Western and Eastern blocs of the Cold War era remained balanced. This was a massive effort by Bhutto to win the friendship of Muslim countries. He visited several Muslim states, made personal relations with various countries' leaders, and clamored for more action on unity and cooperation between these countries.

Bhutto played an active role in the revival of OIC, whose aims and objectives were to forge unity among Muslim nations. That event underlined Pakistan's leadership role in the Muslim world and its commitment to Islamic solidarity when the 1974 OIC Summit was held in Lahore. Many Islamic Summit Conferences took place in Pakistan itself, and many were attended on behalf of the cause of Muslim unity, economic cooperation, and collective security. These conferences also offered an opportunity to stake a claim for the Palestinian cause and the Kashmir dispute. Bhutto developed strong bilateral relations with the key Muslim countries that would be of primary interest to him, i.e., Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, and Egypt. All these relations were of utmost importance to cater to economic aid, military support, and political backing. Ziring (1990) wrote:

What was left of Pakistan, he reasoned, was solidly Islamic. Moreover, Pakistan formed the eastern frontier of the Muslim heartland and looked westward towards Iran and Turkey into the Arab Middle East, Egypt, and the states of North Africa. Pakistan, Bhutto declared, was a Middle East country. This nation drew its purpose and identity from the dry sands of the Arabian peninsula, not from the steamy jungles of the subcontinent. Bhutto hosted the Islamic Summit of Heads of State in Lahore in February 1974 to demonstrate his intimacy with the Muslim nations. The Summit also underlined his quest for stature among those of shared culture. No other event did more to enhance Bhutto's bona fides as a leader of the less developed states (Burke & Ziring, 1990, p.417).

Analyses of Bhutto's foreign policy and related diplomatic initiatives are part of the historiography of this period. In this light, Historians analyze the effect of such efforts on Pakistan's standing in the international community, in particular, the successes and failures of the OIC and other diplomacy initiatives that in any way affected the question of Pakistani national identity and foreign policy more broadly.

East Pakistan's separation was the catalyst for escalating regional, ethnic, and linguistic frictions into a full-blown, violent ethno-nationalist issue. Therefore, The government was required to

reverse such centrifugal forces, reinstate a sense of national unity, and pacify such inner. One such panacea for seeking more cohesive national integration was the idea of Islamic solidarity. Through an appeal to a common Islamic identity, the government would be able to subsume the inner ethnically based and regional cleavages that threatened to rend the nation asunder.

The educational curriculum was revamped to increase Islamic history, culture, and values. The inclusion of Islamic studies as a compulsory subject in schools and harnessing the education system to introduce principles of Islam were some other salient features—encouragement and promotion of Islamic culture through state media, public events, and cultural institutions. National symbols, such as the flag and the anthem, were also projected as the embodiments of the Islamic identity of Pakistan. As these played their part in grooming Islamic values and impressing the sense of oneness among the state nationals, religious institutions such as mosques, madrassas, and Islamic research centers got adequate support from the government with regard to establishment and extension.

11. Military Cooperation

Pakistan made various defense pacts and treaties with several Muslim states. The pacts provided the means to mutually defend each other, military training, and the sharing of intelligence. Military aid to Pakistan from Saudi Arabia, Libya, and other states came in the form of arms and equipment. This type of aid was required to refit Pakistan's military equipment. Combined military exercises between Pakistan and other Muslim nations were carried out, and norms of military cooperation and interoperability were established.

The governance structure in Pakistan is such that democratic input is low, and thus, civilian oversight of the military is low. As can be easily deduced from the country's political record and the military's involvement in politics, the military has traditionally dominated policies relating to defense. It has led in all vital sectors, including foreign policy and security matters, i.e., Indo-Pak relations, nuclear affairs, and Kashmir. This situation can be expected to continue far into the future (Pattanaik, 2000).

The period from 1971 to 1979 was an important phase in Pakistan's political history, characterized by attempts to remake a lost national identity, forge Islamic solidarity, and assume leadership over the Muslim world. Indeed, the Muslim bloc was anchored in Pakistan's foreign policy and domestic political process, providing a template through which it would seek to address domestic and external challenges.

The civilian rulers, particularly Z.A. Bhutto, vigorously pursued the idea of an Islamic bloc as a means toward national unity, enhancing Pakistan's international standing and redressing the regional crisis and economic woes. Political historiography from this period seems burdened by the complexities and problems associated with tackling a national identity crisis, laying the foundations of civilian rule, and building Islamic solidarity.

Historians evaluate here the role of the political elite, Bhutto's leadership intervention, and other broader sociopolitical dynamics of development that became part of Pakistan's course during these years. This comprises a discussion regarding the successes and limitations of the government's efforts, the interplay between ideology and policy, and its implications for Pakistan's future.

This period remains of tremendous importance for scholars seeking to understand nation-building, identity formation, and political development within Pakistan. Lessons from this period echo contemporary debates on national identity, governance, and the role Islamic solidarity plays in setting the state's trajectory.

The other key feature is the suppression of regional and ethnic identities. The ruling military dictators, in general, looked upon any move aimed at acknowledgment and jubilation of Pakistan's diverse ethnicities and regional cultures as a serious threat to the country's unity. History writing, therefore, under military influence has often been reduced or overlooked as representative of the rich tapestry of Pakistan's ethnic groups from Baloch, the Sindhis, the Pashtuns, and others. It creates a monolithic national identity that would help centralization and uniformity at the cost of diversity and decentralization, thereby helping the military's central authority. Another hallmark of this period was glorifying national heroes, mainly people like Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. This gets carried out with an idealistic portrait of the individuals whose achievements are inflated and flaws deflated. While Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, is an infallible visionary, Bhutto, despite a controversial political career, is remembered for his populist policies and charismatic leadership. This kind of selective glorification helps unify symbols for the nation and lends legitimacy to the military regimes by association with such revered figures.

Similarly, there is a downplaying of internal conflicts and tensions. Military regimes are interested in projecting a stable and cohesive front to the nation; therefore, sanitized historical accounts minimize or avoid any reference to internal strife. Such conflicts as the secession of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, ethnic insurgencies, or political uprisings get cosmeticized or represented in ways that absolve the military from blame. This revisionism upholds the image of strength and unity, central to the military's projection. History has constantly been under rewriting to suit the ideology of military-backed governments. Curricular reforms and official histories, most of the time, are changed to reflect the then-reigning ideology of the ruling military: boasting of the military's role in the defense of the country, portraying military putsches as intervention needed for national interest, and portraying civilian governments as either corrupt or inept. Military regimes use this control over history's narrative to legitimize their rule, justify actions, and perpetuate their power.

Prominent among these are an Islamic identity and the Two-Nation Theory as fundamental guiding principles, suppression of regional and ethnic identities, national heroes elevated to superlatives, silencing, and bloodshed suppression on internal fronts, and selectiveness in the remolding of history. It all boils down to strengthening military domination, justifying its forays into politics, and globalizing the collective memory of this nation in a manner conducive to long-term domination.

12. Conclusion

The decade from 1971 to 1979 is considered to be one of the worst periods in the history of Pakistan, for it was mainly due to the separating of East Pakistan and the consequent creation of Bangladesh that the country went through a serious crisis of its identity. The loss of the eastern part not only negated the Two-Nation Theory but also obliged Pakistan to contemplate what being a unified nation really meant. Consequently, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's regime resorted to Islamic Socialism by intertwining the religious tenets with the socio-economic reforms thus aiming at unifying the people, doing away with the disparities, and making the state stronger.

The New 1973 Constitution, the dissemination of Islamic values via education and mass media, and the pro-active policy in the Muslim world were some of the measures taken to build up a common national identity. Yet, notwithstanding these attempts, the decade turned out to be quite strenuous. Struggles between the civilian rulers and the army, ethnic and regional discontent, and political turmoil all contributed to the obstructive character of Bhutto's reforms. Although Islamic Socialism envisioned the merger of religion and state in order to promote fellowship, the use of authoritarian tactics coupled with internecine wars led to the emergence of new rifts. The police

action of General Zia-ul-Haq that resulted in the overthrow of Bhutto in 1977 was a turning point in the political arena as it signaled the resumption of Islamization and, at the same time, the consolidation of the military's dominance over the political sphere. This period illustrates the difficulties of nation-making in a heterogenous politically charged society. The measures of bringing about unity through the channels of religion, reforms, and foreign ties testify to the past as well as the limitations of the national identity redefinition process. The implications of this period are still very pertinent, as they provide lessons on governance, civil-military relations, and the never-ending battle to handle the coexistence of regional, ethnic, and religious identities in Pakistan.

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