Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan’s Only Option Against Indian Threat of Full-Fledged Conventional War
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51872/prjah.vol6.Iss2.432Keywords:
Nuclear Deterrence, Kashmir Dispute, Kargil Conflict, Terrorism, India, PakistanAbstract
States usually utilize all available options in order to secure it against its adversaries. Pakistan also followed the same path after experiencing a setback in its third war against India in which it lost the territory of East Pakistan; it was a defeat difficult to digest as more than ninety thousand Pakistani civilians and soldiers were taken as war prisoners by India military which had made an intervention inside East Pakistan This defeat eventually led Pakistan on the path of nuclear weapons programme. It became successful in acquiring nuclear weapons capability in the 1980s and considers it a source of security against India as it bridges the gap of India and Pakistan’s conventional military asymmetry. This research has looked into the role of nuclear deterrence in averting full-fledged war between India and Pakistan between 1986-87 and 2016. This research uses qualitative methodology with thematic analysis. The data was collected through semi-structured interviews with expert informants. The major objective was to assess the role of nuclear weapons in bringing restraint on Indian side and averting full-fledged conventional war between India and Pakistan. This research finds that nuclear deterrence successfully deterred India from initiating full-fledged conventional war against full-fledged war against Pakistan.
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