Nuclear Deterrence and Indo-Pak Conventional Military Asymetry:  Revisiting Indo-Pak Brastacks Crises 1986-87

Farooque Ahmed Leghari; Imran Ali Noonari; Muhammad Ali Pasha Panhwar

Authors

Farooque Ahmed Leghari
Imran Ali Noonari
Muhammad Ali Pasha Panhwar

Keywords:

Nuclear Deterrence, Nuclear Coercion, Brasstacks Crisis, Military Asymmetry, India, Pakistan

Abstract

This India and Pakistan have a history full of wars, conflicts and crises. The two countries were involved in three major wars and different other crises before nuclearization. India and Pakistan had become successful in getting the nuclear weapons capability in 1980s. And after that the two states have been involved in different crises, conflicts and limited war but short of full-fledged war. This article uses qualitative methodology with semi-structured interviews from expert informants to look into the understanding of nuclear deterrence in Indo-Pak Brastacks Crisis while highlighting tIndia’s nuclear coercion Indo-Pak conventional military asymmetry. The findings explained that nuclear deterrence successfully averted Indo-Pak Brastacks Crisis in in 1986-87 by bridging the gap of Indo-Pak conventional military asymmetry with a psychological impact of ending Indian superiority complex.

Author Biographies

Farooque Ahmed Leghari

Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Pakistan.

Imran Ali Noonari

Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Pakistan. Email:

Muhammad Ali Pasha Panhwar

Associate Professor, Department of Economics, University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Pakistan. Email:

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